Microbiological zoonotic emerging risks, transmitted between livestock animals and humans (2007-2015) by Filippitzi, ME et al.
1 
 











Veterinary Epidemiology Unit, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Ghent University, 
Merelbeke, Belgium. 
2
Scientific Committee and Emerging Risks Unit, European Food Safety Authority, Parma, 
Italy 
3
Research Unit of Epidemiology and Risk Analysis applied to veterinary sciences (UREAR-
ULg), Center for Fundamental and Applied Research for Animals and Health (FARAH), 
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, University of Liege, Belgium. 
*Corresponding author: Filippitzi M.-E.; Current address: Tel: +32 9 264 75 48; Fax: +32 9 
264 75 34; E-mail address: mariaeleni.filippitzi@ugent.be 
Short title: Microbiological zoonotic emerging risks  
The work was carried out at the Scientific Committee and Emerging Risks Unit, European 











As part of the Emerging Risk Identification (ERI) activities of the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), a literature search was conducted to identify the microbiological agents 
transmitted between livestock animals and humans that have been suggested as having 
emerged between 2007 and 2015 in peer-reviewed scientific literature published during the 
same period (2007-2015). According to the criteria set, the search identified seven such 
zoonotic agents, namely West Nile Fever virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Crimean-Congo 
Haemorrhagic Fever virus, Influenza A H1N1 virus, Coxiella burnetii, Streptococcus suis and 
livestock associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus clonal complex 398. An 
explanation of the agents’ consideration as emerging risks is provided. The experience gained 
from these emergences has shown that, detection of and response to such risks can be 
achieved faster and more successfully within a multidisciplinary, collaborative context at the 
field, local, national and international levels. 
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INTRODUCTION   
The landscape of infectious diseases is in flux. New microbiological agents emerge and 
known agents may acquire new characteristics and arise in unexpected environments or food 
vehicles. A significant number of the agents causing human infectious diseases are zoonotic, 
meaning that can be transmitted between vertebrate animals and man under natural conditions 
(EFSA/ECDC, 2013). These agents pose a potential risk to public health. 
The successful identification of risks at their early inception is a core aspect of public health 
protection. For this purpose, in 2007, the EFSA established the Emerging Risks (EMRISK) 
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unit, which plays a key role in the coordination of EFSA’s activities to develop a capacity for 
Emerging Risk Identification (ERI). The unit (merged with the Scientific Committee (SC) 
unit in May 2013, forming the Scientific Committee and Emerging Risks Unit (SCER)) is 
responsible for supporting the development, establishment and operation of structures for the 
collection and evaluation of information, and knowledge networks for the sharing 
information, with respect to identifying emerging risks in the fields of food and feed safety, 
and animal and plant health (EFSA 2012A, 2012B, 2014). According to the current EFSA 
definition, an emerging risk must fulfil the following criteria: (i) be a newly identified hazard 
(i.e. previously non-existing or not known) for which a significant exposure may occur; or (ii) 
be a re-emerging hazard (i.e. already known) to which an unexpected or increased exposure 
and/or (iii) increased susceptibility may occur (EFSA, 2007A, 2015). 
Despite the unpredictable nature of disease emergence, there are lessons to be learnt from the 
diseases that have already emerged during the past few years. The study and understanding of 
these diseases could pave the way for the further development of strategies and activities on 
Emerging Risk Identification (ERI). Within the framework of the ERI procedure at EFSA 
(EFSA, 2015), this review aims to identify the microbiological agents that have been 
suggested as having emerged during the period 2007-2015, in peer-reviewed scientific 
literature published during the same period (2007-2015) and to explain why the above agents 
have been considered as “emerging risks”. The scope of the review includes zoonotic agents 
transmitted between livestock and humans via various routes. These agents fall under the 
mandate of EFSA on biological hazards, which covers animal health (EFSA, 2008), food 
borne (EFSA, 2011A) and non-food borne zoonotic diseases (EFSA, 2011B).   
MATERIALS AND METHODS  
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This review took into consideration any virus, bacterium, alga, fungus, parasite, and their 
products (e.g. toxins, biological amines) according to four sets of criteria (Table 1). With a 
view to identifying emerging risks according to the criteria set, a literature search was 
performed between 01/2013 and 04/2013 as well as 11/2015 and 01/2016, and included peer-
reviewed, scientific articles published in English from 01/2007 to 01/2016 (i.e. during 9 
years). These articles were retrieved from eight journals, seven of which were selected based 
on their high impact factor according to ISI Web of Knowledge
SM
 (Journal Citation 
Reports®) in the areas of interest (i.e. food microbiology, infectious diseases, veterinary 
sciences) and their inclusion in the list of sources of information that have been systematically 
screened by the SCER unit and based on this experience have been evaluated as appropriate 
and useful for information collection on the same areas(EFSA, 2010A). PLoS ONE was 
an additional journal selected after using the search string to screen PubMed in title. The 
PubMed screening was performed before the screening of the selected journals in title and 
abstract. The reason it was performed was to confirm our initial selection of search string and 
journals. The eight selected journals were: International Journal of Food Microbiology, Food 
Microbiology, Eurosurveillance, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Clinical Infectious Diseases, 
Journal of Infectious Diseases, PLOS ONE, Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. The 
following search string was used: (emerging OR new OR unknown) AND (zoonosis OR 
microbiological) AND (cattle OR goat OR horse OR pig OR poultry OR sheep). The search 
string was applied to the search function of the journals. Due to issues related to its search 
engine, the journal “Emerging Infectious Diseases” was screened issue by issue. 
The articles retrieved were submitted to a “first screening” for their relevance on title and 
abstract. Those considered relevant were subject to “second screening” eligibility on the full 
text. When additional information on a particular issue was needed, the references of primary 
articles were also reviewed and taken into consideration, if relevant, as well as research 
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reports from international organizations. A database was created in Microsoft Excel, in order 
to gather information for the analysis (i.e. on the type of pathogens, hosts, transmission 
mechanisms, implications in human health, novelty and scale of specific incidents).  
RESULTS  
The search strategy produced for seven of the journals a total of 1,241 scientific articles, from 
which 319 articles were subject to a second screening eligibility on the full text (Table 2).  
The journal “Emerging Infectious Diseases” was screened issue by issue without using the 
search strings, due to issues related to its search engine. From its first screening in title and 
abstract, 80articles were selected for second screening. The process resulted in the 
identification of seven biological agents suggested as emerging risks, transmitted between 
livestock animals and humans. The information collected in the Excel database justifying their 
selection is shown in Table 3. 
Biological Agents suggested as Emerging Risks  
West Nile Virus (WNV) 
West Nile fever is a notifiable, mosquito-borne zoonotic disease caused by West Nile Virus 
(WNV). The infection is maintained in a bird-mosquito enzootic cycle, and birds (especially 
Passeriformes) are the primary reservoir hosts. Horses and humans are considered as 
accidental dead-end hosts, and considered not to transmit the virus to other mosquitoes 
(EFSA, 2011C; WHO, 2015). WNV is widely distributed throughout the world. In Europe, 
though, the disease situation has been evolving in recent years (DEFRA, 2012). In 2008, a 
large outbreak occurred in Italy affecting humans and horses (Angelini et al., 2010). In 2010, 
the first clinical cases in horses and humans were detected in Spain and Greece (García-
Bocanegra 2011A, 2011B). In the same year, clinical cases in horses and humans were 
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reported again in Italy, while clinical cases in wild birds were reported in Hungary and 
Austria.  
During 2010-2011, disease in humans and horses was reported from many EU (Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) and neighbouring countries (Albania, FYROM, Israel, 
Morocco, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine) (DEFRA, 2012; EFSA, 2012C). Furthermore, the 
number of probable and confirmed human cases in the EU and in neighbouring countries 
increased considerably during the transmission season (June-November) in 2011 (128 cases 
detected in the EU and 212 in neighbouring countries) and 2012 (242 cases detected in the EU 
and 693 in neighbouring countries) (ECDC 2011, 2012). This situation raised concern 
regarding the public and animal health and required surveillance and control activities to be 
put in place (DEFRA, 2012; Angelini et al., 2010; EFSA 2012C). The WNV, and particularly 
lineage 2, is now considered endemic in parts of South Europe and risk-based surveillance is 
implemented (DEFRA, 2012). 
Rift Valley Fever Virus (RVFV) 
Rift Valley Fever (RVF) is an infectious zoonotic disease mainly affecting livestock 
ruminants, and occasionally humans. It is listed as a notifiable disease according to the World 
Organization for Animal Health (OIE) (WHO, 2015). The virus is widespread in Africa and 
continues spreading into new areas. In 2000, the first outbreak of RVF outside the African 
continent occurred in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The disease re-emerged in Kenya, Tanzania 
and Somalia by the end of 2006, Sudan in 2007 and South Africa in 2011.  The RVF was 
introduced onto the French island of Mayotte, in the Indian Ocean, with several clinical 
human cases, in May 2007 (Chevalier et al., 2010; EFSA, 2005). The public health impact of 
RVF epidemics has been significant. Indicatively, the case fatality rate reached 14% during 
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the epidemic in Saudi Arabia in 2000, while in 2007-2008, 738 human cases were officially 
reported in Sudan, including 230 deaths (Chevalier et al., 2010). 
RVF epidemics appeared for the first time in the Middle East in 2000 and became more 
frequent in Africa from 2006 to 2008,  probably in association with the intensification of 
animal trade (Shoemaker et al., 2002) and climate change (Chevalier et al., 2010). Higher 
temperatures combined with increased precipitation may further affect distributions of 
potential competent vectors that already occur in EU (e.g. Culex pipiens) (EFSA, 2013) in the 
future, lead to a higher vector competence and, thus, a higher disease transmission rate. The 
risk of a potential disease spread into the EU, although generally considered as low, it has 
been suggested to be more relevant for EU countries of the Mediterranean basin, based on the 
abundance of the vector Culex pipiens, the livestock densities and the higher temperature in 
the region (Chevalier et al., 2010; EFSA, 2013; Vittecoq et al., 2012).  
Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus (CCHFV) 
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is an acute, highly-contagious, tick-borne viral 
zoonosis, listed as notifiable by OIE (WHO, 2015). A range of domestic (e.g. cattle, sheep 
and goats) and wild animals may serve as hosts of the virus. CCHF is an endemic disease in 
more than 30 countries of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In the EU, the 
disease is currently endemic only in Bulgaria. However, since 2000, CCHF endemicity has 
also been established in other neighbouring Balkan counties and Turkey (EFSA, 2012C; 
Maltezou et al., 2009, 2010). In June 2008, the first non-imported fatal case was recorded in 
northern Greece (Papa et al., 2008). The emergence and/or re-emergence of CCHF in the 
aforementioned areas has been attributed to climate and ecologic changes and mainly to 
various anthropogenic factors that can affect the hosts or the distribution, abundance and 
competence of the tick vectors (Maltezou et al., 2009).  
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The first time reporting in an EU country (Greece, 2008) and the onset of community 
outbreaks involving an increased number of documented human cases in EU (i.e.  Bulgaria) 
and EU neighbouring countries (i.e. Turkey, Albania, Kosovo, Ukraine, south-western regions 
of the Russian Federation) since 2000 (Maltezou et al., 2010), justify the consideration of 
CCHFV as an emerging risk. Given the wide distribution of CCHF vector, the numerous 
animal species that can serve as hosts, and the favourable climate and environmental 
conditions (altering the tick’s growth pattern or redirecting the migration routes of birds that 
host the affected ticks to areas newly warmed), one cannot exclude the possibility of a further 
expansion of the disease occurrence, especially in European countries bordering the 
Mediterranean sea (Maltezou et al., 2010). 
Influenza A H1N1 virus 
Influenza A viruses are important human and animal pathogens with high impact on public 
health and animal husbandry. They may infect humans and various other animal species, 
including pigs, birds and poultry (EFSA, 2010C), and frequently present new subtypes of 
varying pathogenicity. In 2009, a new human influenza A virus subtype H1N1 was reported 
in Mexico and the United States and spread worldwide within a few months, causing disease 
in humans and other animal species, including pigs (Collignon, 2011). Although the epidemic 
spread purely among humans, the pig played an important role in the virus ecology due to its 
ability to support replication of influenza viruses from avian, swine and human species. 
Overall, over 18,449 deaths in humans were recorded worldwide (WHO, 2011). 
It is justified to consider that this virus emerged, since this subtype was not previously 
described and contained a combination of gene segments not previously reported in swine or 
human influenza viruses (Garten et al., 2009). It also spread quickly around the world 
(Collignon, 2011), causing the World Health Organisation to raise its pandemic alert (WHO, 
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2011). Pandemic plans were triggered internationally. But, even though huge efforts were 
made to contain the spread of the virus and large amounts of resources were expended, they 
appear to have had little influence on the virus’ spread and the prevention of infection 
(Collignon, 2011).  
As was evident during the 2009 epidemic, coordinated surveillance of human and animal 
influenza viruses is vital. Rapid detection of human infections with new influenza viruses and 
timely identification of new virus variants in swine, can lead to an effective response to the 
emergence and spread of a novel influenza virus in humans (Lindstrom et al., 2012). Further 
new reassortments of the influenza A virus are to be expected in the future with possible 
change in pathogenesis. Already in March 2013, an A(H7N9) virus of avian origin which had 
not previously been seen in people, was found in China. Since then, infections in both humans 
and poultry have been observed, however sustained human-to-human transmission has not 
been reported (Chen et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2014; WHO, 2014). 
Coxiella burnetii 
Coxiella burnetii is an intracellular bacterium causing Q fever, a worldwide zoonosis. The 
bacteria has a wide distribution in domesticated and wild animals, but transmission to humans 
is mostly associated with sheep and goats (van der Hoek et al., 2012). Humans get infected 
mainly through inhalation of contaminated aerosols. In around 60% of cases, human infection 
with C. burnetii remains asymptomatic (Roest et al., 2011).  
The incidence of human Q fever has increased considerably over the previous years (Munster 
et al., 2012).  Prior to 2007, the disease was uncommon in Europe (ECDC, 2010), except for 
some local outbreaks (e.g. Germany, 2005) (Munster et al., 2012). However, from 2007 to 
2009, the Netherlands faced large seasonal Q fever outbreaks, with the highest peak in 2009 
(van der Hoek et al., 2012). The origin of these outbreaks has been in question. Despite the 
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suggestion of goat manure as their source (Hermans et al., 2014), their true origin remains 
unclear (van den Brom et al., 2015).  The outbreaks resulted in an increase of the number of 
human cases, which reached 3,523 notified cases in the country (Schimmer et al., 2008), the 
highest number reported in the literature (Munster et al., 2012). Even though Q fever is a 
notifiable disease (WHO, 2015), it is known to be under-diagnosed and therefore under-
reported (Coulombier, 2010). Belgium, Cyprus and Germany also reported an increasing 
number of cases since 2007, albeit to a smaller extent (ECDC, 2010).  
The first documented (Karagiannis et al., 2007) outbreak of Q fever in 2007 and those that 
followed until 2009, showed some divergence from the general epidemiology of Q fever seen 
in the EU as a whole (EFSA, 2010B). In this case, human infections occurred over 
consecutive years, most victims were not occupationally related to domestic ruminants and an 
unusually high number of human infections were reported. The above suggests that Q fever 
may be regarded as a disease that emerged (EFSA, 2010B; USDA, 2010). 
The reasons for the emergence of this outbreak(s) in the Netherlands are not clear and no 
specific source could be formally identified. The disease did not spread (by the airborne route) 
from the Netherlands to neighbouring countries (i.e. Germany, Belgium) (ECDC, 2010). 
Overall, it is justifiable to consider Q fever as a disease with minimal general public health 
impact in the EU, but there are circumstances in which the associated risk is significantly 
elevated (from either direct (occupational) exposure to Q fever infected animals, or 
community based exposure caused by an elevation of C. burnetii in the wider environment).  
Streptococcus suis 
Streptococcus suis is recognised as a major swine bacterial pathogen. Since the first human 
case in Denmark (1968), human cases have been reported worldwide, from North and South 
America, Asia and Europe (Wertheim et al., 2008). They are more often reported, though, 
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from countries where pig-rearing is common and especially Southeast Asian countries 
(Palmieri et al., 2011). 
Serotype 2 is considered to be the most pathogenic for both humans and pigs and is the most 
common cause of the disease in humans (Wertheim et al., 2008). S. suis is generally 
considered as an occupational disease (Palmieri et al., 2011).There is also evidence of 
potential food-borne transmission (EFSA, 2007B) in Southeast Asia, via consumption of local 
delicacies (e.g. undercooked pig tonsils, intestines, uterus and fresh pig blood) (Wertheim et 
al., 2008; Huong et al., 2014). 
In 2005, the largest outbreak of human infection caused by S. suis serotype 2 (SS2) so far 
reported, occurred in Sichuan Province of China (more than 150 cases and 30 reported 
deaths), while a smaller outbreak had previously occurred in 1998 (Palmieri et al., 2011; 
Kerdsin et al., 2011). These severe outbreaks posed serious concerns to public health. On the 
one hand, because they challenged the conventional conception that opportunistic infections 
of SS2 in humans represented only sporadic cases; on the other, because they were 
characterised by more rapid disease progression and higher rate of mortality, due to 
streptococcal toxic shock syndrome, a presentation of illness previously only associated with 
Streptococcus pyogenes (Wertheim et al., 2008; Feng et al., 2009, 2010). From 2005 onward, 
the number of reported S. suis infections in humans has increased significantly worldwide, 
also in countries where the infection had been rarely or never previously reported (Palmieri et 
al., 2011; Gottschalk et al., 2010). Indicatively, from 2007 to 2009 the total number of S. suis 
reported cases increased from 409 to over 700 (Wertheim et al., 2008). For these reasons, S. 
suis has been suggested as an emerging zoonotic agent. 
In general, currently, S. suis is a rare disease in humans (with the exception of China and 
Thailand), probably underdiagnosed, that occurs sporadically. Whilst more common in Asia, 
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it is a disease with increasing number of human infections (including deaths) and, therefore, 
of global public health concern, especially in countries with extensive pig farming; thus, the 
importance of hygiene on pig farms should be highlighted (EFSA, 2007B). The pathogen 
receives growing attention not only for its role in severe and increasingly reported infections 
in humans, but also for its involvement in drug resistance (Palmieri et al., 2011; Callens et al., 
2013).  
Livestock associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus clonal complex 398 
(LA-MRSA 398) 
Staphylococcus aureus is a zoonotic and human pathogen that is characterised by an 
increasing proportion of drug-resistant strains, including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus (MRSA).  
In the past, MRSA was mainly considered as a nosocomial pathogen, but since 2000, the 
majority of infections are community-acquired (van Loo et al., 2007; Feingold et al., 2013). 
Recently, it has become apparent that animals, particularly pigs and also veal calves and 
broiler chicken, can constitute an MRSA reservoir and be the source of a “novel and rapidly 
emerging” type of MRSA in humans, namely MRSA clonal complex (CC)398 (LA-MRSA 
CC398) (Lewis et al., 2008). LA-MRSA CC398 was first detected in the Netherlands in 2003 
and, as of 2010, it accounted for over 40% of the MRSA human isolates in the country 
(Huijsdens et al, 2009; Feingold et al., 2013).  
Even though the disease was first detected in 2003, it has been suggested as emerging in the 
years since then. One of the reasons why, is that it was found with low (van Cleef et al., 2010; 
EFSA, 2009B) yet increasing frequency (van Loo et al., 2007; Lewis et al., 2008; van Rijen et 
al., 2008; de Jonge et al., 2010) in human patients on a worldwide scale. In addition, new 
information on LA-MRSA has been provided by several studies. For instance, recent evidence 
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suggests that humans represent an important source of new pathogenic strains affecting 
livestock (Fitzgerald, 2012) and that some other livestock (i.e. bovine) S. aureus strains may 
have the capacity to colonise humans (Fitzgerald, 2012; García-Álvarez et al., 2011; Laurent 
et al., 2012). The latter is potentially of public health importance, as it may lead to the 
emergence of new LA-MRSA strains in humans (Fitzgerald, 2012; van der Mee-Marquet et 
al., 2011). Therefore, it is suggested that targeted surveillance is required to allow early 
identification of animal clones that have moved into human populations (Fitzgerald, 2012), 
and is a convincing case demonstrating the importance of the “one-health” approach.  
DISCUSSION  
The majority of the biological agents transmitted between livestock and humans that were 
identified as emerging risks in this review include RNA viruses (WNV, RVFV, CCHFV, 
Influenza A(H1N1) virus), most of which are vector-borne (WNV, RVFV, CCHFV) and pose 
mainly an occupational risk. No food-borne agent of zoonotic (livestock) origin was identified 
as emerging risk, however the review process revealed ample documentation that the burden 
of viral food-borne illness is significant. 
The accumulated, albeit incomplete, knowledge gained from emerging diseases of the past 
(e.g. on type and special characteristics of agent, transmission route, drivers of emergence) 
can trigger an early identification of new risks and of changes in influential sectors or drivers 
which may give a first indication of potential emerging risks. For instance, due to the high 
mutation rate of RNA viruses (Drake et al., 1999; Parrish et al., 2008), such viruses carry a 
higher risk of potential emergence (compared to most DNA viruses). Additionally, drivers 
such as increased human and animal mobility and environmental change have made vector-
borne diseases not just a problem of the tropics, but a global issue, irrespective of limited 
resources and poor surveillance (Pfeffer
 
& Dobler, 2010). A greater understanding of the 
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population dynamics of reservoir species due to ecological changes (e.g. deforestation linked 
to Nipah emergence in human populations in Malaysia in 1998 (Chua et al., 2002)) and the 
role of wildlife, coupled with the study of human behaviour (e.g. use of bushmeat and 
traditional burial practices linked to Ebola spill-over to humans and spread among them in 
Africa (Alexander at al., 2015)), would be useful for predicting the possibility of emergence.  
The knowledge gained from past experience also includes the lessons learnt in terms of 
outbreak control and risk management. The detection of what went right and what went 
wrong onnational and international level (e.g. in terms of coordination, financial resources, 
availability of diagnostic tools, human resources, time until vaccine development) can prove 
very useful for a rapid and more efficient containment of  potential threats in the future and 
the minimisation of their impact. On the basis of experience from the recent response to 
H1N1 pandemic, it can be said that the world was relatively well prepared for it, as pandemic 
preparedness plans and strategies had already been created to combat the previous H5N1 
pandemic, leading to improved infrastructure and surveillance capacity (FAO/OIE/WHO, 
2011). However, the vaccination campaign, which was rolled out after the peak of the 
epidemic, did not have a favourable cost-benefit ratio (Collignon et al., 2011; Klenk et al., 
2011). Focussing on the Q fever control in the Netherlands, the Dutch government's approach 
to controlling the disease with the mass cull of all pregnant goats on positive farms was 
perceived as controversial (Lubick, 2010). Yet, the close cooperation eventually achieved 
between the human and veterinary fields in knowledge exchange and improvement of 
diagnostic tools and methodology, was essential for responding to the outbreak and 
demonstrated the benefits of the One Health approach (Roest et al., 2014). 
The results of this review are based on the screening of a limited number of journals, but we 
believe that they provided us with the necessary data, given their high impact factor and high 
publication rate in the areas of interest. In case a journal had not published any article on these 
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agents with a content relevant to this review (i.e. related to an agent’s emergence), it was 
considered that this agent was not identified as an emerging risk  during the screening of this 
journal (Table 2), even though the journal might have published articles on this agent from a 
different perspective.  
The excluded articles fell mainly into two categories. The first and larger included articles on 
agents that met most but not all criteria set for this review. Such agents cause for instance: 
non-zoonotic vector-borne human diseases (e.g. Chikungunya virus), zoonotic diseases 
transmitted between humans and animal species other than livestock (e.g. Usutu virus from 
birds, Marburg and Ebola viruses from non-human primates or bats, Middle east respiratory 
syndrome (MERS) from dromedary camels and possibly bats), zoonotic diseases transmitted 
between humans and livestock in areas remote from Europe (e.g. Hendra and Nipah viruses). 
Into the same category fell articles on food-borne agents without (e.g. Noroviruses) or not 
proven (e.g. E.coli O104:H4) zoonotic origin. The second category included articles where 
terminology (i.e. emerging, emergence, emerge) was used for known agents to which no new 
exposure or susceptibility was observed at the time of the research (e.g. often the case for 
antimicrobial resistance of Salmonella spp, Campylobacter spp and Listeria spp or VTEC non 
O157). The terminology was used with caution in the majority of articles screened, following 
the principles of risk communication. These principles suggest a careful selection of 
terminology in order to avoid unnecessary scares due to risk overestimation or a lack of 
measured response due to a risk underestimation (EFSA, 2012D). 
Experience has shown that the next major emerging risk is unlikely to be identical to its 
predecessors. It is therefore necessary to move forward flexibly, using new strategies, along 
with those already known to be effective (FAO/OIE/WHO, 2011). Further research in capture 
and trend analysis of drivers, disease surveillance and monitoring procedures could increase 
the likelihood of bringing new risks to light. This would include surveillance informed by 
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evidence-based risk assessments combined with climate change and societal aspects, 
development of early warning systems and continuous monitoring of sporadic zoonotic 
diseases for changes in transmission patterns. New horizons have also opened with the use of 
new technologies, such as satellite monitoring of land and ecosystem changes or the use of 
mobile phones to facilitate the real-time reporting of unusual events. Development and 
implementation of a specific prioritisation method of emerging risks is also a necessity to 
ensure a more appropriate subsequent assessment of these risks. Last but not least, a better 
understanding of the human-animal interface and disease emergence requires a strong 
leadership and real efforts to engage different disciplines (FAO/OIE/WHO, 2011). Expecting 
the unexpected is crucial, but preparing for the unexpected is fundamental, and can only be 
achieved successfully within a multidisciplinary, collaborative context which operates at the 
field, local, national and international levels. 
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 The search string implemented in the search engines was formulated as: (unknown 
OR emerging OR new) AND (zoonosis OR microbiological) AND (livestock OR cattle OR 
goat OR horse OR pig OR poultry OR sheep); 
b 
Journals screened concurrently; 
c 
The 
“Emerging Infectious Diseases” journal was screened issue by issue.; d Some agents were 
identified in more than one journal. 
Table 3. Information collected in the Excel database on the zoonotic biological agents 
suggested as emerging risks (2007-2013) 
Legend: 
a
 The information provided in this column(s) corresponds to the respective criteria set 
(Table 1) 
b 
Novelty refers to whether the hazard, source, or route of contamination/exposure is 
new; 
c 
Scale refers to the number of people and Member States exposed to this hazard; 
d 
RNA 
refers to the ribonucleic acid; 
e 







Criteria set for the selection of biological 
agents (namely) 
Description of the agents’ criteria 
i. Disease transmission to humans Zoonotic, transmitted between livestock animals 
and humans via one or more of the following 
ways: 
 by vectors or rodents; 
 through direct or close proximity with 
infected livestock; 
 through the environment (e.g. contaminated 
water); 
 through consumption of contaminated food 
or drinking water. 
ii. Time range Have been the causative agents for incidents of 
human disease that occurred from 2007 until 
2015. 
iii. Geographic range Occurrence anywhere in the world is considered, 
if there is a potential European perspective (e.g. 
linked to climate change or the globalisation of 
trade). 
iv. Criteria of an “emerging risk”  The biological agent: 
 constitutes a hazard identified for the first 
time since 2007 which was recurrently 
reported until 2015, representing an increased 
exposure to it, or 
 constitutes a known hazard (that is before 
2007) to which an unexpected new or 
increased exposure and/or susceptibility 
occurred or was occurring until 2015. 
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Number of biological 
agents suggested as 
emerging risks 
International Journal of 
Food Microbiology & 
Food Microbiology
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Journal of Infectious 
Diseases
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309 69 2 
PLOS ONE 260 58 5 
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(criterion i)
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Reported  human 
cases 






1. Mosquito borne                       
2. Via organ 
transplantation, 
blood transfusion 
3. Exposure to 
blood or tissues of 
infected animals 
(horses) 
(occupational)           
Asymptomatic or mild febrile 
disease (most commonly); 
meningitis and encephalitis 
(~1%) (severe form of 
disease) 
Increased 
exposure due to 
geographic 
expansion of the 
virus into new 






130 probable and 
confirmed 
autochthonous cases in 













1. Mosquito borne 
2.Exposure to 
secretions of 
infected animals                        
3. Exposure to 
tissues of infected 
animals 
(occupational) 
Unapparent infections, or with 
mild, influenza-like symptoms 
(in most cases); haemorrhagic 
fever, with hepatitis, 
thrombocytopenia, icterus, and 
multiple haemorrhages (most 
severe form). 
Increased 
exposure due to 
geographic 
expansion of the 
virus into new 










(2000); Has not 
reached Europe. 
Saudi Arabia, 2000: 
fatality rate reached 
14%; Sudan, 2007-
2008: 738 human cases 
officially reported, 














1. Tick borne                                 
2. Exposure to 
blood or tissues of 
infected animals 
(occupational)         
or humans          
3.Nosocomial 
transmission 
High fever of sudden onset, 




may occur in late stages of the 
disease. 
Increased 
exposure due to 
geographic 
expansion of the 
virus into new 





outbreaks in EU 
and neighboring 
countries; first 
time in Greece 
(2008) 
CCHF outbreaks have 
a case fatality rate of 











1. Air borne                                                                 
2. Exposure to 
secretions of 
infected animals 
(occupational)         




Mild disease, mainly affecting 
the respiratory tract; acute 
respiratory distress syndrome 
requiring intensive care 
treatment for a significant 
number of predominantly 










deaths in humans 
worldwide (WHO, 
2011) with an 
estimated range 
between 151,700 and 
575,400 deaths 
(Dawood et al., 2012) 












1. Air borne                                    
2. Exposure to 
infected animals  




Acute infection: non-specific 
symptoms, most commonly 
flu-like (incl.high fever, 
headache and cough, atypical 
pneumonia or hepatitis); 






The Netherlands  
Confirmed human 
cases: 168 (2007), 
1,000 (2008), 2,357 
(2009); hospitalization 
rate: 50% (2007), 
20.9% (2008), 19.7% 











2.Exposure to  pig 
meat 
(occupational) 
Meningitis and sepsis are the 
most common clinical 
manifestations of S. suis 
infection; hearing 










1,600 human cases 
worldwide by 2012, 
most of which 
originating in 
Southeast Asia and 
10% of which were in 
the European region 
(Huong et al., 2014).  
From 2007 to 2009, the 
total number of S. suis 
reported cases 
increased from 409 to 




















infected animals              
(occupational) 
LA-MRSA 398 usually causes 
colonization; has, albeit rarely, 
been associated with deep-
seated infections of skin and 
soft tissue, pneumonia and 






only a small proportion 
of the total number of 
reports of MRSA 
infections in the EU 
(EFSA, 2009A), but its 
frequency in human 
patients has been 
increasing (Cuny et al., 
2015) 
